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CONTRACT SOCIETIES:
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES CONTRASTED'
Written by Shinichir6 Michida 2
Translated by Veronica L. Taylor 3
Abstract: This translation of an original Japanese language work by Michida
Shinichir6 contrasts the differences between the understanding of contractual
obligations in the United States and in Japan. The translation cites specific differences
between each country's statutes and case law, as well as distinct cultural factors that are
important when considering respective understandings of contract in these societies.
Translator's Introductory Note: This translation is intended to give readers an introduction to Japanese
contract law theory and its operation in that society. Professor Shinichiri Michida was writing for a
general audience in Japan, not simply for those with legal training. One of his aims was to debunk the
myth that the Japanese have no sense of contract-a theory that had been popularly accepted within
Japan, as well as in the United States.
The value of this extract for foreign lawyers is that it demonstrates the interplay of codes,
statutes, cases and scholarly writing in a civil law system like Japan's. As this extract shows, the major
role of legal scholars in civil law countries is to synthesize reported cases and statutes by interpreting the
underlying policy of code or statute provisions. Instead of criticizing and attacking court decisions and
their underlying policy motives, however, Japanese commentators commonly affirm decisions and explain
their reasoning in applying legal theory. The scholar's role in a civil law system is to generate legal
theory, rather than to force its adoption by practitioners.
Veronica Taylor 4
INTRODUCTION
In 1975-76, while teaching a course on U.S.-Japan transactions at
Harvard Law School, I was invited to address the Japan Society in New
York. Using Japanese law reports and statistics, I talked about differences
I Translated from Shinichir5 Michida, Keiyaku shakai: amerika to nihon no chigai a miru (Contract
Societies) (Yfihikaku. 1987). This translated extract covers Chapter 1. pages 1-4 and Chapter 2. pages 43-
77. All yen amounts have been converted to US dollars at the rate of 360 yen to the dollar, which
approximates the exchange rate at the time the cases discussed were decided.
2 Professor Shinichir5 Michida (1923-1988) was a former Dean of Kyoto Law School (1980-82),
Chairman of Japan's Comparative Law Association and Japan's first representative to UNCITRAL (the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law).
3 B.A., (Honors) 1986, LL.B., 1988 Monash, Australia: LL.M.. 1992 University of Washington"
Lecturer. Law School, University of Melbourne.
4 The translator wishes to thank Toshiko Takenaka for her assistance in the preparation of this
translation.
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between the Japanese and American legal systems. It was a non-controversial
topic and, final applause aside, it was received in silence. Then, at the end of
the presentation, an American attorney asked a question that made everyone
gasp: "According to Professor Chie Nakane's Japanese Society,5 and another
book by Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima, 6 the Japanese have no concept of
contract. You will no doubt agree, Professor Michida. Would you comment
on this?"
I replied: "With the greatest respect, I do not agree. ' 7 The audience
stirred. I continued, suggesting that Americans may disregard contracts and
promises to a greater degree than Japanese. According to Japanese contract
theory, even an oral agreement becomes a contract, while in America, where
contract theory differs markedly from Japan's, many kinds of oral agreements
are not recognized by law. Leaving aside comparison with Americans, can we
really say that the Japanese lack a concept of contract?
In 1986, Japanese businessmen in New York were still troubled by this
resilient belief that Americans honor contracts, while the Japanese have no
concept of them. Even Michiko It6, a Japanese lawyer admitted to the New
York bar writes in her book Essential Legal Knowledge for a Posting to
America: "Americans honor their contracts... [I]n comparison with this, we
Japanese do not have a clearly defined concept of contract." 8 Thanks to
theories propounded by Japanese academics and lawyers, energetic Japanese
businessmen who did honor their contracts were angered by [the refrain]"
and so we doubt that your company is any different... "
CONSENSUAL CONTRACTS
The Marubeni Iida v. Aji no Moto Case
Professor Kawashima's Legal Consciousness of the Japanese uses the
sale of soybeans by Marubeni Iida to Aji no Moto to illustrate that "among
merchants there are many occasions when there is no way to clarify whether
5 Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Pelican Books, revised ed 1973).
6 Takeyoshi Kawashima, ed. Nihonjin no hoishiki (The Legal Consciousness of the Japanese)
(Iwanami Shinsho, 1967); Partial translation by Charles R. Stevens, The Legal Consciousness of Contract
in Japan, 7 Law in Japan 1 (1974).
7 [Translator's note] Professor Kawashima was a University of Tokyo scholar and Professor Michida
was from Kyoto University. These law schools rank first and second among Japan's prestigious national
universities, and they have a long tradition of academic rivalry.
8 Michiko Ito, ed, Amerika chiizaiin no tame no h5ritsu j~shiki (Essential Legal Knowledge for a
Posting to the United States) at 4 (Yihikaku Sensho. 1984).
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or when a contract for a business transaction has been formed, [as in] the
example of a lawsuit between two of the largest enterprises in Japan . .. "9
When prices in the international market for soybeans dropped, Aji no
Moto repudiated the agreement, but Marubeni ida argued that a contract had
been formed because the parties had reached agreement. In response, Aji no
Moto asserted that, in addition to the English language sales agreement
existing between the parties, a written agreement in Japanese was required for
a binding contract. The Tokyo District Court handed down a decision
supporting Marubeni lida's position.
However, if we broaden our inquiry and consider America and England
at the time, a completely different view of the case is possible.
The seller was a trading company established in 1916 as Takashimaya
Iida K.K. It commenced proceedings against Aji no Moto in March 1951, but
was acquired by, and merged with, Marubeni before the date of judgment. It
appears as Marubeni lida in the court record. "Aji no Moto" is a well-known
seasoning in which soybeans and wheat flour are the main ingredients. The
purchaser, Aji no Moto K.K. was a major buyer of soy-beans.
With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 commodity
prices escalated, but by the Spring of 1951, as the situation stabilized, prices
dropped. Import prices, which had climbed to $160 per ton were halved. The
transaction between Marubeni ida and Aji no Moto took place during this
price fall. Soybeans and soybean curd (tofu) are an indispensable Japanese
food product, but Japan depends on supplies from the United States.
Takashimaya lida was a trading company, but it had no grain silos of its own
in the United States, nor did it purchase soybeans directly. Instead, it made its
purchases from American grain trading companies and sold in turn to Aji no
Moto.
In this case, Takashimaya lida bought soybeans from one of the world's
largest grain trading companies, Louis Dreyfus. The Dreyfus head office was
located in Paris, but its New York office oversaw its Tokyo office. On March
2, the New York office, through Tokyo, called for offers [for soybeans] with
deliveries scheduled for April, May and June. Takashimaya lida received the
inquiry and entered into a transaction with Aji no Moto on this basis, which
culminated in litigation. In this case an English language contract existed
between the parties, however it was accepted that the purpose of this was to
forestall any inconsistencies with the content of the sales agreement between
Takashimaya ida and Louis Dreyfus.
9 Kawashima, 7 Law in Japan at 7.
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The soybeans totaled about 30,000 tons, were valued at about
Y1,800,000,000 (approximately $5,000,000) and were delivered in three
shipments. By July and August, all three ships had entered Japanese ports.
Before the ships' arrival in port, Aji no Moto had begun negotiations with
Takashimaya lida, seeking a price reduction in light of falling prices in the
soybean market. On June 2, Aji no Moto communicated its view that no
contract had been formed. Takashimaya lida then sold the soybeans to
another buyer, but suffered a Y666,000,000 ($1,850,000) loss, and demanded
this amount in compensation. Counsel for Aji no Moto asserted in response
that:
Leaving aside sales of goods in small quantities, a commodity import
agreement of this size should be concluded in writing... the English
language contract covers only the outline of the agreement, whereas a
Japanese language agreement would set out in detail provisions
necessary for performance of the agreement. Because the agreement
cannot be performed by reference only to the English language
contract, it cannot be regarded as being formed at the time that the
English language contract was written.
My view of this case is as follows. The case commenced in 1951.
Looking comparatively at the rest of the world in the first half of this century,
[we find] England playing a central role in commodity sales agreements of
this type. In England, sales agreements for goods in excess of £10.00 were
required to be in writing and signed by the obligor. Agreements in breach of
this express provision in the Sale of Goods Act would be void. The provision
requiring contracts to be in writing originated in a statute enacted in 1677,
and was repealed in 1954.10
If we consider the sale of goods statutes in England and America at the
time, it is not so surprising that Aji no Moto insisted on formation of the
contract being conditioned on preparation of a writing in Japanese. [Even in]
present day America, a vast amount of litigation arises from a bias against
oral agreements, and requirements for contracts to be in writing."
Aji no Moto's view of contract in 1951 was consonant with the English
and American theories of contract in vogue at the time. Its argument would
10 [Translator's Note] The American adoption of the English approach is discussed further in
Chapter 3 of Contract Societies, which is not translated in this extract.
11 [Translator's Note] Discussed further in Chapter 3. Contract Societies.
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have been completely logical and legal in either England or America.
Accordingly, I view Marubeni 1ida v. Aji no Moto as a symptom of socio-
economic "illness" occurring in any country, although I would avoid
suggesting that it is an illness peculiar to large Japanese corporations.
My interest is in why the Aji no Moto claim rejected by the Tokyo
District Court-that a sales contract requires writing-is regulated by
legislation. Put another way, legal principles and trials are really prescriptions
for social and economic "illnesses;" my interest is drawn to why these
prescriptions differ in America and Japan, which is better, and whether either
presents problems.
In the case of everyday medical illnesses, like a cold or the flu, my
experience is that American and Japanese doctors' prescriptions are generally
similar. However, when it comes to socio-economic "illness" like contractual
disputes, American and Japanese prescriptions are exact opposites. Here I
consider why this [difference] continues within different legal cultures.
An Experienced Doctor's Prescription : The Consensual Contract
The significance of the Marubeni Iida Case is that the Tokyo District
Court decision represented an experienced doctor's prescription for the
"illness:"
If [one views] a sales contract being formed by means of a contract in
writing... it is easy to see that it would give rise to situations in
which sales opportunities would be lost ... if trust is presumed, this
would remove any anxiety arising from the lack of [evidence in the
form of] a contract in writing... There are insufficient grounds for
overturning the Civil Code principle of consensual contracts and
requiring a writing as a contract formality . . . in the case of a
commodity import sales agreement, where there is a mutual intent
between the parties, it is not appropriate to view the agreement in
writing as a commercial custom, as the defendants argue, but it is
appropriate to view the agreement in writing as something usually
prepared for the purpose of confirming a contract already in
existence. 12
12 8 Kakyfi Minshci 1366 at 1415-1416 (Tokyo Dist Ct, 31 July 1957); emphasis added.
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Consensus (dakusei) is a slightly difficult word in Japanese. It does not
appear in the Iwanami Japanese Language Dictionary. 13 Those readers with
legal training will know, however, that dakusei means formation by
consensus; that the contract comes into being merely through agreement (gji)
of the parties. Just why the Tokyo District Court decision above was an
"experienced doctor's" prescription will be apparent when we compare it later
with the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Ozier v. Haines.14
Consensual Contracts and Exceptions: Real Contracts
In Japan sales agreements are consensual contracts, but not in America.
Consensual contracts-contracts formed by mere oral agreement-are the
paradigm in Japan. It is true, however, that not all contracts in Japan are
consensual contracts. There are exceptions. Consensual contracts are those in
which the contract gains its validity merely from the parties' expression of
mutual intent; a real contract (yrbutsu keiyaku)15 is one which requires
delivery of the subject matter of the contract, or some other kind of
performance or payment before it becomes effective. Of the type contracts in
the Civil Code, 16 sales (baibai), leases (chintaishaku), employment contracts
(koyo-), contracts for work to be done (ukeoi), mandates (inin), partnerships
(kumiai), life annuities (shFishin teikikin) and compromises (wakai) are all
consensual contracts; gifts (zoyo-)17 are treated in principle as consensual
contracts. In contrast to this, loans for consumption (shihi taishaku), loans
for use (shiy3 taishaku) and bailments (kitaku) are regarded as contracts
requiring payment or performance. Outside the Civil Code, pledges (shichi
keiyaku) and earnest money agreements (tetsuke keiyaku) are contracts
requiring payment or performance.Is
13 Iwanami kokugojiten, (Iwanami, 4th ed 1986).
14 Ozier v Haines, 99 NE2d 395 (1951).
15 Realvertrag.
16 [Translator's Note] In addition to the principles of contract appearing in the general provisions of
the Civil Code, the Code sets out provisions on thirteen specific "types" of contract, often called "named"
contracts. Nine "type" contracts are also named in the Commercial Code. Contract rules relating to more
recent kinds of contracts, e.g., franchises and distributorships, are often developed by applying by analogy
the provisions relating to "type" contracts.
17 Civil Code, Art 550: A contract of gift which is not in writing may be revoked by either party;
however this shall not apply in respect of any part as to which performance has been completed.
18 Saburo Kurnsu. Dakusei keiyaku - y5butsu keiyaku (Consensual Contracts and Real Contracts),
in Hiroshi Matsukawa. ed, Minji Higaku Jiten. J5maki (Civil Law Dictiona, Vol 2) (Yfiihikaku, Supp
1964).
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Naturally pledges require delivery of the thing pledged. The Civil Code
covers this not in the Contracts section, but in the section dealing with Real
Rights (bukken):19
Article 334. A pledge shall become effective upon the delivery to the
obligee of the thing pledged.
Difficult legal questions emerge when contracts requiring payment or
performance are viewed as exceptions to consensual contracts, but I will not
consider these here.
Professor Kurusu's definition of consensual contracts, like those of
Professors Kawashima and Wagatsuma,20 belongs to the traditional approach,
which emphasizes party agreement and a meeting of minds. However,
Professor Hoshino's explanation is that a contract is formed not by party
intention, but as a result of the application of law: "A contract . .. is a
promise, the performance of which is protected by law." He defines
consensual contracts as those, aside from contracts requiring payment or
performance, which "become effective merely through the parties'
promises." 21
The Origins of the American Bias Against Oral Agreements-The Ozier
Case22
Aji no Moto repudiated its Y1,800,000,000 contract with Marubeni Iida
on June 2, 1951. Two days prior to this, the Supreme Court of Illinois handed
down a decision concerning a contract for the sale of corn. White Heath, a
grain company which operated Ozier as a partnership, filed a statement of
claim for damages alleging the following facts. On February 11, 1947,
Haines, a farmer, came to the company and sold 5,000 bushels of corn by oral
agreement for $1.24 a bushel. While Haines was in the office, Ozier
telephoned a grain broker and rescinded the purchase of the 5,000 bushels.
19 The Japanese Civil Code. like those of other civil law jurisdictions, conceptualizes legal rights
and obligations as deriving from: general provisions (ssoku), real rights (bukken), claims (saiken),
relatives (shinzoku) and succession (s~zoku). Most of the provisions dealing with contract are found in the
Book of Claims; most of those dealing with property rights are found in the Book of Real Rights.
20 Kawashima, 7 Law in Japan at 1: Sakae Wagatsuma. Saiken Kakuron (Claims - Specific types),
Xfimpc5 Kigi V(Lectures on the Civil Code. Vol V) at 43 (Ivanami Shoten. 1954).
21 Eiichi Hoshino, ed, Minp5 Gairon IV (Keiyaku) (Outline of the Civil Law IV (Contract)) at 20
(Ry~sh5 Fukkyi Kai, 1986).
22 Ozier v Haines, 99 NE2d 395 (1951).
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Haines knew of the subsequent sale, and that oral sales of grain were usual,
and that it was well-known and customary practice for buyers with elevators
to transact immediately with brokers. Nevertheless, when grain prices
escalated, Haines sold his corn to another buyer and failed to deliver to Ozier.
This forced the plaintiff to purchase corn at higher prices elsewhere to meet
its obligation to the broker. The consequent loss was the basis of the claim for
compensatory damages.
Defendant Haines moved for summary dismissal of the claim on the
basis that the Statute of Frauds 23 required that contracts for the sale of goods
over $500.00 be signed by the obligor; since there was no evidence of a
contract in writing signed by him, the court should dismiss the action.
If we compare the court to a doctor, what diagnosis did the American
doctor make in this case? A Japanese doctor would have investigated or
examined the evidence and tried to uncover the truth. The Illinois Circuit
Court did not look at the evidence, but dismissed Ozier's claim
immediately-somewhat like throwing the patient out of the hospital without
an examination.
Ozier appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, arguing that because
Haines knew that the plaintiff relied upon their oral agreement and had
rescinded the purchase of the corn, Haines was estopped from raising the
Statute of Frauds defense. The Appellate Court handed down its decision on
May 31, 1951.24 It upheld the lower court's refusal to consider the case, and
interpreted Illinois precedents in this way. Action taken in reliance on such
promises, as distinguished from action taken in reliance on a
misrepresentation of existing facts, cannot raise an estoppel. While it is true
that equity will not allow the Statue of Frauds to be a shield to shelter a fraud,
the breach of a promise which the law does not regard as binding, is not a
fraud. There does appear to be a moral wrong, but if we attempted to right
this moral wrong under these conditions the statute would be rendered
nugatory. 25
Ozier appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois. However the Supreme
Court found that six elements were necessary for equitable estoppel to
operate in relation to the Statute of Frauds and that these had not been
established here. It upheld the Appellate Court decision: 26
23 Illinois Code 123, Chapter 5, Art 4.
2 4 Ozier v Haines, 99 NE2d 395 (1951).
25 99 NE2d 395 at 396.
26 Ozierv Haines, 103 NE2d 485 (1952).
VOL. I No. I
CONTRACT SOCIETIES
To adopt such a view would render the Statute of Frauds useless and
unmeaning (sic). It is true that harsh results, or moral fraud as
plaintiffs choose to term it, may occur where one has changed his
position in reliance on the oral promise of another, but it is a result
which is invited and risked when the agreement is not reduced to
writing in the manner prescribed by law. The present case is a patent
example, for although the parties were in each other's presence and in
a business office, no attempt was made to reduce their agreement to
the simplest writing.2
7
[Thus] an oral sales agreement was completely barred from the court,
while "moral wrong" and "moral fraud" marched through majestically. The
decision in this case illustrates the systemic bias against oral agreements in
American legal principles.
If we take into account the Aji no Moto claim raised two days prior to
the Court of Appeals decision, we need to broaden our view of both the
Marubeni lida Case and American concepts of contract.
The Reconciliation of Law and Morals
The reason why the Tokyo District Court decision is an experienced
doctor's prescription is because it is morally sound, creates no damaging
influence or side-effects for the Japanese, and it reconciles law with morality.
"Honor your promises" is a fundamental basis of human beings' social
morality. Although I have previously referred to a Biblical passage,28 the
Bible did not exert much influence over Japanese morals until after the Meiji
period (1868-1912). Here I will draw on part of the Analects, which did have
a great impact on Japanese morals. The extract explains the importance of
keeping promises:
Sincerity, faith or credit (shin)-being able to trust the word itself, is
the foundation of a human being's character. A person without
sincerity-whose words cannot be trusted--cannot fulfill his potential
as a human being. Because he has no sincerity, the foundation' for
character, his ability matters not-his character must inevitably
crumble. How can an ox cart without a yoke, or a horse-drawn cart
27 103 NE2d 485 at 488.
28 [Translator's Note] Michida. Contract Societies, at 24. which is not translated in this extract.
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without a harness, go forward? Neither can the life of a person
without sincerity advance. 29
The importance of a principle which recognizes oral agreements as
consensual contracts is that, in the words of the Analects, it supports the
trustworthiness of human words, and makes possible the progress of human
society. The Tokyo District Court decision exposes this fundamental principle
and reconciles it with law, without creating any ill-effects.
The Need for a Writing
The difference between Marubeni 1ida v. Aji no Moto, and Ozier v.
Haines, was whether or not a writing was required for a grain sale, and
whether or not these were consensual contracts.
In America, the current position is still that sales of goods or movables
are not generally consensual contracts, but [require] written agreement, and
that contracts for the sale of land must be in writing. We have looked already
at the sale of goods and movables in Japan, but what about contracts for the
sale of land?
The general provisions of the Civil Code dealing with ownership and
hypothecs 30 state that:
Article 176. The creation and transfer of real rights take effect by a
mere declaration of intention by the parties.
In the Seisho Gakuen (Bible College) Case discussed below, the view
taken by scholars in textbooks and legal references is that a contract can be
formed by an oral promise. Japanese and American contractual principles also
differ, then, in relation to the sale of land.
29 "Hito ni shite shin nakuba, sono kanaru koto o shirazarunari. Taishagei naku, sh5shagetsu
nakunba, sore nani o motte kore o varanva." Kojiro Yoshikawa, Rongo (The Analects) Vol 1 at 52
(Chiigoku koten sen, Asahi Shimbunsha, revised ed 1965).0 [Translator's Note] A hypothec is a civil law real security right, created by contract and
registration. The lender does not take possession of the property, and ownership in the property is not
transferred. Other real rights over inunovables. like superficies (e.g., the lease of a building on the land of
another owner) may also be hypothecated. Hypothecs and superficies are regulated by the Civil Code.
VOL. I No. I
CONTRACT SOCIETIES
New Formalism
Although in principle consensual contracts do not require writing, in
practice, even in Japan, the use of various kinds of written contracts has
spread. In the new edition of the Systematic Civil Law Dictionary, Professor
Toshio Hironaka calls this the "new formalism;"
The use of preprinted forms is increasing . . . [and] this trend is
particularly apparent in transport and insurance industry transactions.
To preserve their fairness, the state subjects these standard form
agreements to some supervision. We must also consider, from
another viewpoint, the existence of formalism. These are situations in
which the law requires a contract to be reduced to writing in order to
ensure that the contents are rational and equitable. For example
Article 25 of the Agricultural Land Law31 requires a writing for a
tenancy agreement (although this provision is interpreted to mean that
a writing is not a prerequisite for the validity of the contract).32
Here we will not go into issues raised by standard form contracts. I
will simply note that when contracts required by law to be in writing are
interpreted as meaning that a writing is not prerequisite for their validity, this
supports the principle of consensual contract. We will consider examples
besides the Agricultural Land Law and the Building Law, but here I want to
explore the characteristics of the former. In particular, I want to contrast this
requirement of writing with the contract-in-writing systems of England and
America, and the "social reliance on lawyers" that has resulted.33
Agricultural Land Law and lt0 v. Kyoto
The Agricultural Land Law was enacted in 1952. Article 25(1)
provides:
31 Nchih5 (Agricultural Land Law) (Law No 229, 1952).
32 Zennosuke Nakagawa. Hiroshi Endo. Hisao Isumi, Taikei Minp5 Jiten - Fud5sant5kih5,
Shakuchih5, Shakkah5 (Systematic Civil Law Dictionary - Real Property Registration, Land Lease and
House Lease Law) at 33 (Seirinsh6inshinsha, 1976); Emphasis added.
[Translator's Note] Japanese Code and legislative provisions may appear to be clearly worded and
are often rather broad. However, as this example illustrates, they need to be read in light of court
interpretation, and influential scholarly theory.
33 [Translator's Note] Described in Michida, Contract Societies, at 33-34. which is not translated in
this extract.
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In a lease agreement regarding agricultural land or pasture the parties
must set out clearly in writing the duration, the amount of rent, and
conditions for payment etc., and any other supplementary contractual
details.
I noted earlier that the Civil Code regards leases as consensual
agreements which do not require writing. All that Article 601 states is that:
"A lease becomes effective when one of the parties has agreed to allow the
other party to use a thing and take profits therefrom and the latter has agreed
to pay rent therefor."
In contrast to the general law of consensual contracts established by
the Civil Code, Article 25(1) of the Agricultural Land Law creates a special
writing requirement for contracts concerning "agricultural land and pasture."
Yet although Articles 92 through 95 of the Agricultural Land Law
establish penalties, none apply to a violation of Article 25()-not creating a
contract in writing. Fines or imprisonment are the usual criminal penalties, but
do any civil penalties attach to a violation of Article 25(1)? Let us consider
some cases.
The transformation of agricultural leases into written documents did not
date from the 1952 Agricultural Land Law, but from Article 9-10 of the 1946
Agricultural Land Conciliation Law34 which revised the 1938 law of the same
name.
In 1951 a case was filed in Kyoto concerning this Agricultural Land
Conciliation Law. 35 The plaintiff, t6, brought suit against the Kyoto Central
Ward Agricultural Committee and the Kyoto City Agricultural Committee.
The defendant argued that plaintiff It6's ascendant had concluded an oral
contract for the lease of agricultural land with two other parties, Imai and
Nakagawa. Plaintiff alleged that an oral contract was in contravention of
Article 9-10 of the Agricultural Conciliation Law and was thus void. The
Kyoto District Court gave judgment on May 21, 1955, holding that:
The plaintiff argues that a lease for agricultural land not made in
writing contravenes Article 9(1) of the Agricultural Land Conciliation
34 N~chi Ch~teih8 (Agricultural Land Conciliation Law) (Law No 42, 1946).
35 Kvoto v t5, 6 (No 5) Gy5sai reishii 1145 at 1152 (Kyoto Dist Ct. 30 June 1955).
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Law and is thus void; however this provision should be construed as a
mere directive provision (kunji kitei).36
That is, the special law provision requiring agricultural leases to be in
writing is not viewed as displacing the Civil Code principles of consensual
contracts, but simply as an informational, optional provision.37 This can be
contrasted with the 1873 English case, Adeane,38 discussed below, in which
the owner of the land, Adeane, and the tenant, Bennett, travel all the way to a
London solicitor's office to draw up an eight-year lease. The English
principle of requiring contracts "not performed within one year of agreement"
to be made in writing-which is still followed today in America-is quite
different from the Japanese principle. The case also shows that, in
comparison with England and America, neither contract principles nor the act
of concluding a contract in Japan required a lawyer.
Building Sites and Building Transactions Law
The purpose of the Building Sites and Building Transactions Law 39 is
both to regulate the broker and to try to protect the buyer. The statute
stipulates that before the contract is formed, the broker must record important
provisions in writing, to deliver this to the buyer and explain its contents (Art.
35). Once the contract is formed, a contract document must be delivered to
the buyer (Art. 37). If the broker fails to deliver a contract in writing, will the
sale of the residential land or building be invalid? All that the statute
prescribes in this case is that a broker who fails to deliver a contract in
writing "is subject to a fine of no more than Y100,000" (currently $769.00).
(Art. 83(l)(3)). So the presumption is that, according to Civil Code
principles, the validity of the sale flows from the parties' intentions,
manifested in their oral agreement.
36 [Translator's note] A kunji kitei is a non-mandatory, procedural statutory provision which is
directed to a court or administrative agency. Contrast this with the different terms used for optional and
mandatory provisions of the Civil Code. An optional provision within the Civil Code is classified as a
nin'i kitei. .Mandatory provisions in the Civil Code (e.g., conformity with the public policy and good
morals requirement of Article 90) are classified as ky5k5 kitei.
37 [Translator's note] A "special law" is legislation which supplements the Codes, either by
providing more detail on areas of law covered broadly by the Codes. or regulating new, non-Code subjects.
Where special law provisions apply, and conflict with more general Code provisions, the special law takes
precedence.
38 Erskine vAdeane, 8 Ch App 756 (1837).
39 Takuchi tatemono torihikigydh5 (Building Site and Building Transaction Law) (Law No 176,
1953).
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The statute is applicable to situations where a consensual contract is
formed, but the issue is whether it binds the parties. For the purpose of
consumer protection, where a contract is concluded through offer and
acceptance made outside the broker's office (as in the case of door-to-door
sales), the statute will apply: (i) where the buyer is given notice by the broker
of the revocation of an offer, or the means of rescinding the contract are
provided for in a Ministry of Construction Order, and the offer is revoked or
the contract is rescinded within 5 days of the agreement, and (ii) where
residential property or a building is transferred, but the full price has not yet
been paid. In this case revocation of the offer or rescission, made in writing,
will be effective if accepted by the buyer (Art. 37(2)).
Installment Sales Law
In 1961 the Installment Sales Law 40 was enacted with consumer
protection as one of its objects. This statute also obligates brokers to prepare
and deliver contracts in writing, but a writing is not a condition of contractual
validity: "[a]ny person contravening Article 4 by not delivering a contract...
is subject to a fine of no more that Y100,000." (Art. 53(3)). So the principle of
consensual contracts-validity stemming from oral agreement-is adopted
here, and the regulations regarding installment sales are arranged around it. A
special consumer protection provision allows revocation of offers and
rescission where a purchaser makes an offer and concludes a contract outside
the broker's place of business (Art. 4-3).
Laws Regarding Door-to-Door Sales
The Door-to-Door Sales Law41 was enacted in June 1976, one year
after the Suehiro v. Seisho Gakuen Case discussed below. The statute
requires a contract in writing to be delivered (Arts. 4 and 5), but this is not a
condition of contractual validity. The sanction for not preparing a contract in
writing is merely "a fine of no more than Y100,000." (Art. 23(1)). As with the
Installment Sales Law, a special consumer protection provision allows
revocation of offers and rescission where a purchaser makes an offer and
concludes a contract outside the broker's place of business (Art. 6).
40 Kappu hanbaih5 (Installment Sales Law) (Law No 159, 1961).
41 H6mon hanbai t6 ni kansuru h~ritsu (Law Concerning Door-to-Door Sales)(Law No 57. 1976).
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Sale of Land and the Seisho Gakuen Case Warning
The principle of consensual contracts applied in Japan to sales of land
as well as to sales of goods, but on June 30, 1976, the Tokyo High Court
rendered a significant decision in which it found no contract for the sale of
land where the agreement had not been made in writing.
It was April 1972, and Suehiro Shrji, a real estate brokerage, received
a commission from Nitta Mokuzai K.K., which required land for residential
development. Negotiations commenced with Seisho Gakuen, an educational
institution seeking to sell some vacant land.
Seisho Gakuen had loans from the Chiba Mutual Bank and others
totaling some -3,000,000,000 ($8,333,000) and was under pressure to sell the
land in order to reduce the debt. Negotiations stalled initially as Seisho
Gakuen set its selling price at around Y4,000,000,000 ($11,110,000) and
Nitta offered a purchase price of ;3,500,000,000 ($10,270,000). Seisho
Gakuen then attempted to sell the site to Tokyo Tatemono K.K. and Tokyo
Fud6san K.K., but [these discussions] ended without a contract being
concluded. Seisho Gakuen then reconsidered Nitta Mokuzai. Its director
approached Suehiro Sh6ji and requested it to finalize the transaction for
Y3,700,000,000 with the brokerage fee to be paid separately.
In a different transaction, Nitta Mokuzai had gained approval from
Chiba Mutual Bank for financing its property acquisition. Because the buyer
was financed by Chiba Mutual and the seller would extinguish its debt to the
same bank in this transaction, the meetings were scheduled to take place at
Chiba Mutual's head office. The first meeting took place on May 15.
However, the buyer offered Y3,500,000,000 and the seller Y3,700,000,000,
with no consensus reached. The manager of the bank's head office took the
median price and proposed -3,600,000,000. Buyer and seller undertook to
consider this price and the meeting concluded. Four days later, Seisho
Gakuen held a directors' meeting and resolved to accept :3,600,000,000 and
to pay the brokerage fee.
On the 20th of that month, the director of Seisho Gakuen met with the
managing director of Suehiro Shrji in a coffee shop under the JR Chiba
Railway Station. He requested that the Suehiro representative finalize the sale
at Y3,600,000,000, with a brokerage fee of Y4,000,000 ($11,000). Nitta
Mokuzai agreed to the deal.
To confirm the parties' intentions, a second meeting was held at the
Chiba Mutual Bank office on the 23rd of the month. Nitta Mokuzai was
represented by its president, and Seisho Gakuen by its director responsible
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for the negotiations. All parties agreed that the sale price would be
Y3,600,000,000, with brokerage fees of¥4,000,000 yen per side (Y8,000,000
in total) being paid to Suehiro Sh5ji. The purchase agreement was drawn up
in the early part of the next month, and provided for the immediate payment
of 30% of the purchase price and the brokerage fees, with the balance
payable once there was a clear prospect of the hypothec right of the Chiba
Mutual and six other banks being removed from the register. After agreement
had been reached, the parties, at the direction of the Chiba Mutual Bank Head
Office Manager, made a courtesy call on the bank's managing director and the
head of the Examination Division, to report the content of the agreement.
The issue here is whether a contract for the sale of land had been
formed.
Triangular Relationships and Prescriptions
It was early June, time for the preparation of the written agreement.
But Seisho Gakuen made no communication to Nitta Mokuzai or Suehiro
Sh6ji, and on June 7, sold the property to Iwabuchi Sangy5 K.K. The written
agreement with Nitta Mokuzai was never drafted. When the prospect of being
able to sell for a higher price presented itself, Seisho Gakuen chose Iwabuchi
as its transaction partner, and failed to pay the brokerage fee to Suehiro.
The Shinchd Kokugo Dictionary defines a "triangular relationship" as a
complex relationship involving three parties. The Seisho Gakuen/Nitta
Mokuzai-Suehiro Shfji-Iwabuchi relationship was certainly of this kind.
What propelled Seisho Gakuen towards a triangular relationship was no
doubt the pressing need to dispose of accumulated debts. But on the other
hand, they almost certainly consoled themselves with the thought that Japan is
a land of free competition, and that the right to conclude contracts should also
be free. Suehiro Sh6ji brought suit in the Chiba District Court on August 10
for the brokerage fee it would have received from Seisho Gakuen.
Looking at this case, there will be some readers who will want to
conclude that the Japanese have no consciousness of contract. But, as I have
previously indicated, I see this more as a social (or interpersonal) "illness."
Not only Japan, but also America suffers from "triangular relationship
illness." What kind of diagnosis and prescriptions will the "doctors" (or the
courts) make?
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Real Estate Brokerage Fees and Compensation
In Suehiro Shiji v. Seisho Gakuen, the Chiba District Court rejected
Suehiro's claim for damages on July 15, 1974. Suehiro then filed a k6so
appeal42 with the Tokyo High Court, seeking ¥4,000,000 and disaffirmation
of the District Court judgment. The fifteenth civil division of the Tokyo High
Court handed down its decision on June 30, 1975.43 The Tokyo High Court
found that, since there was no contract formed between Nitta Mokuzai and
Seisho Gakuen (for reasons discussed below), Suehiro's claim for
compensation based on the contract could not be sustained. But the Tokyo
High Court did in fact assist Suehiro: it found against Seisho Gakuen in the
amount ofY3,200,000 ($8,888) plus 20% per annum interest between the date
of judgment and the date of final payment. The court "prescription" contained
a vital ingredient, strengthening societal health and interpersonal relations.
Before turning to the nature of the "vital ingredient," we should consider the
court's view of real estate transactions and brokerage fees.
The judgment broadly divides contracts for real estate brokerage fees
into two kinds. The first is "exclusive brokerage" (senzokuteki nakagai),
where (i) the broker provides an introduction and the mandator is obligated to
accept this, 44 or (ii) the client may not give the business to another broker
simultaneously without consent of the first, or (iii) the mandator may not enter
negotiations directly with the other party, or (iv) termination or withdrawal
during the transaction is not permitted, or (v) a special agreement has been
entered into to this effect. The court found that no such special agreement
existed between Suehiro and Seisho Gakuen, so their relationship was not of
this kind.
The second model is "simple brokerage" (tanjun nakagai), of which
there are two types: (i) where the broker is given agency powers by the
mandator, and (ii) where no agency powers attach to the broker. The court
found that the Suehiro-Seisho Gakuen relationship was of the latter kind, a
simple brokerage, with no power of agency. Leaving aside the ordinary
situation where negotiations proceed to sale, the court said:
42 [Translator's note] Two opportunities to appeal exist in Japanese civil procedure. The k5so
appeal is review to which the appellant is automatically entitled, in which the merits of the case as well as
questions of law are reexamined. A furtherfjdkoku appeal may then be made for reexamination on points
of law.
43 Suehiro Sh5ji v Seisho Gakuen, Hanrei Jih6 (No 790) 63 (Tokyo High Ct, 30 June 1975)
(Hereafter kfso appeal).
44 [Translator's note] "Mandate" is the civil law concept which approximates to "agency" in the
common law.
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The mandator is not obliged to accept the introduction... he or she
has the freedom to reject it, and where he or she entrusts the same
property of the same description to two or more brokers
simultaneously, the mandator is free to select the introduction of his
or her preference . . . he or she may also rescind the brokerage
contract at any time without requiring a special reason to do so.
45
Having focused on this "freedom", the court went on to find that Seisho
Gakuen had entrusted Suehiro with something to sell; where there is such a
mandate and the parties agree, this becomes a contract of mandate under the
provisions of the Civil Code:
Article 643. A mandate becomes effective when one of the parties has
commissioned the other party to do a juristic act, and the latter has
consented thereto.
In this kind of contract of mandate, the effect of the Civil Code
provisions is that a right to claim compensation will only arise where there is
a special agreement. Mandate is essentially a gratuitous act:
Article 648. In the absence of special agreement a mandatoree cannot
demand remuneration from the mandator.
However, paragraph 3 of the same provision qualifies this:
Article 648(3). If a mandate terminates in the course of performance
owing to any cause for which the mandatoree is not responsible, he is
entitled to remuneration in proportion to the performance already
effected. (Emphasis added)
This provision opens up the possibility of compensation when part of
"the performance is already effected." In this case, it could not be said that
Suehiro had already performed its mandate to sell the property. If unable to
claim compensation, could Suehiro claim expenses? The court said this:
45 Kaso appeal, 66.
VOL. I No. I
CONTRACT SOCIETIES
In a simple brokerage for real estate the broker does not bear an
obligation to make the sale... when a sale takes place as a result of
the broker's introduction, this merely gives rise to the right to claim
compensation (or the mandator's obligation to pay
compensation)--there is no other right to claim expenses.46
Any attempt to aid Suehiro on the basis of these Civil Code provisions
alone would fail. The court made a further finding about real estate brokerage
contracts:
Real estate brokerage contracts do not belong to any of the classical
contract "types" [under the Civil Code]. They are "non-type"
contracts, and thus, depending on the actual circumstances of the
case, will be subject to the application by analogy of [Civil Code]
provisions on mandate, sub-contracting, commercial agency (shji
nakadachi),47 employment and the like, as well as administrative
provisions of the Building Site and Building Transaction Law.48
In other words, the court gave judgment applying provisions by
analogy to the actual circumstances of the mandate. Application by analogy,
however, is not something that should be allowed to escalate to an unlimited
extent. Here, the issue was in what circumstances will compensation "in
proportion to the performance already effected" be permitted?
Good Faith: the Principles of Trust and Breach
In order for the right to compensation under Article 648(3) to apply by
analogy, the court required two elements. The first was that "the broker has
expended considerable effort to establish the sale, which, in the normal
course of [a transaction], would have been viewed objectively as [sufficient]
to bring the sale to a conclusion." The second requirement was "special
circumstances in which the mandator has breached his duty of good faith and
has abused his freedom." "Good faith" is the principle of good faith and trust
46 K~so appeal. 66.
47 [Translator's note] Sh5ji nakadachi (Commercial Agency) is not a type-contract under the Civil
Code, but it is regulated by provisions including Civil Code Art 656. dealing with quasi-mandate (un
inin); Commercial Code Art 502 dealing with commercial agency, and by analogous application of the
Civil Code provisions on contracts for work (ukeol).4 8 K~so appeal, 66.
WI1NTER 1992
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
found in Article 1(2) of the Civil Code: "[t]he exercise of rights and
performance of duties shall be done in [good] faith and in accordance with the
principles of trust." The court pointed to Seisho Gakuen's breach of faith and
failure of trust in the following passage:
The krso appellant and mandator (Seisho Gakuen) . . . despite
reaching actual agreement with the buyer and having decided to take
steps to prepare a contract in writing . . . without contacting the
buyer-and certainly without his consent-sold the property to
Iwabuchi Sangy6 for the purpose of gaining a higher price ... The
above actions by the appellant must be viewed as contravening the
principle of goodfaith.. . 49
The judgment went on to apply Civil Code Article 648(3) by analogy;
here oral agreement had been reached and the only performance outstanding
was the preparation of the contract in writing and payment. Taking this into
consideration, the court reduced the agreed fee by one-fifth, and ordered
Seisho Gakuen to pay -3,200,000 and interest.
The court found that a contract on the verge of formation is not a
contract, but it was prepared to recognize the efficacy of "actual agreement"
in order to deal with the case as an application of the principle of good faith.
"Good faith" (shingi) is defined in everyday Japanese as "to make
efforts to honor a promise," and "sincerity" (seyitsu) is defined as
"seriousness [of purpose]; honesty" (Iwanami Kokugo Dictionary). When the
court uses the words "principle of good faith," the meaning derives from this
definition of "good faith." The core of the concept of "good faith" is that
promises must be honored. "Promises" are "what one agrees to do for
another, or do mutually; the content of such agreement" (Iwanami Kokugo
Dictionary). People's promises range in strength and form, from the most
casual to an agreement regarding immovables.
One of the features of Japanese law, in contrast with the American
situation, is the willingness to impute liability in some circumstances to pre-
contractual promises. No doubt it pained Seisho Gakuen to hear in a public
courtroom that it had not acted in good faith, but, just as the expression "good
medicine tastes bad" indicates, I regard the court's prescription as widely
applicable "good medicine."
49 Kaso appeal, 67.
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Suehiro Sh6ji was assisted by the decision, but what of Nitta Mokuzai,
who thought that they had an agreement which merely required transcription?
Why was this viewed as not constituting a contract?
The Writing Requirement: Custom and Intent
Why, if an oral agreement was reached at the Chiba Mutual Bank
headquarters on May 23, did the Tokyo High Court not recognize this as a
contract? Let us look at the connection between the court's reasoning and the
principle of consensual contracts. The emphases and numbering in the extract
are mine.
(1) In a sale of property for a considerably high price, it is
clear that in reality the well-settled practice is to prepare a contract in
writing which incorporates standard form conditions, including
penalty provisions, and the details of the transaction, and make a
payment of earnest money or part of the sale price... 50
If a "well-settled practice" is "clear . . . in reality," then a general
provision of the Civil Code regulating juristic acts will apply:
Article 92. If, in cases where there exists a custom which differs from
any provisions of laws or ordinances which are not concerned with
public policy, it is to be considered that the parties to a juristic act
have intended to conform to such custom, and that custom shall
prevail.
Accordingly, the decision establishes that where there is a "well-settled
practice" of preparing a written contract, the "parties intention to follow this
practice should be presumed." 51
(2) This practice must be given due weight; if one adopts this position
and parties in a real estate sale transaction are regarded as following
the practice, then it is appropriate to view preparation of a contract in
5 0 Kso appeal, 65.
51 [Translator's note] The EHS (Eibun hereisha) translation of the Civil Code renders the Japanese
term kansh7 as "custom." Different jurisdictions use different terms for this concept; here I have used
.practice" in the sense of "trade practice."
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writing and payment of part of the sale price as essential elements in
the formation of the sale. 52
(3) In this case, there is no clear manifestation of an intent not to
follow the practice outlined above. Because the parties agreed, in line
with usual practice, to prepare a contract in writing and pay part of
the sale price, failure to do so must result in failure to form a contract
of sale.53
The judgment rejects the view that a contract of sale was formed.
Dissatisfied with the Tokyo High Court decision, the parties made ajkoku
appeal to the Supreme Court. My research failed to discover a Supreme Court
report for Suehiro Shfji v. Seisho Gakuen; inquiries to the lawyers for both
sides revealed that the parties settled before a final decision was rendered.
Settlement meant that the Supreme Court lost the opportunity to comment on
this 1975 Tokyo High Court decision, but it remains worthy of careful
attention, nonetheless.
One reason for studying the decision is that numerous real property
textbooks and legal guides state that the sale of real property can be effected
by oral agreement:
(1) An oral agreement is effective as a contract but... preparing a
contract in writing is advisable to avoid problems further down the
track.54
(2) Oral [agreements] are not uncommon . . . Writing is not a
requirement. This is what is meant by freedom of form being one of
the elements of freedom of contract. Thus a so-called "oral promise"
has binding force... but to avoid the unnecessary danger of inviting
disputes, in a high-value contract like a real estate transaction,
preparation of a contract in writing is almost essential. 55
52 K6so appeal, 65.
53 Kso appeal, 65.
54 Sh~ji Shinozuka, ed, Fud,5sanh(5 nojg5shikij5maki (Real Estate Law General Knowledge, Vol 1),
at 188 (Nihonhy6ronsha, 1972).5 5 Kikuo Ishida & Masao Osawa, eds, Fudjsanh Nvionon (H5gaku NyTanon K(5za) (Introduction to
Real Estate Law (Lectures in Introduction to Law)), at 80-81 (Seirinsh5in Shinsha, 1978).
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(3) Preparation of a contract in writing is not a legal condition of
contract formation ...a contract for the sale of real property in
principle derives its efficacy from the expression of the parties' intent
(Civil Code Art. 176), but . .. there is no harm in preparing a
carefully drafted contract.56
(4) Question 1: You have arranged to buy land and a building from an
acquaintance. Details have been settled, but when you suggest
drawing up a contract, the other party says, "we don't need to -set this
out again in a contract." Is it correct to assume that a contract has
been formed at this point? Or, will there be disadvantages in future if
there is no contract in writing?
Answer: A writing is not usually required to form an effective contract.
In Question 1 the details have been settled, so there is a contract. Preparation
of a contract in writing has no bearing on this.57
Well, this is probably what Nitta Mokuzai and Suehiro Shfji thought
when they entered their real estate transaction negotiations in 1972. The
buyers, Nitta, did not initiate the litigation, but assuming that they had, what
kind of result could they have expected from the Tokyo High Court in 1975?
We cannot be certain, but it is possible that no contract would have been
found between Nitta Mokuzai and Seisho Gakuen. Of course, all kinds of
criticism of the judgment can be made after the event, but the failure of
Suehiro's argument based on consensual contract should not be ignored.
"Sales of property for a considerable price" will continue to occur in the
future. To ensure that the sale goes through, the buyer will need to fulfill the
requirements set out by the Tokyo High Court. It is worth examining these in
more detail.
"Intent" and Presumption
The Tokyo High Court decision refers to "sales of property for a
considerably high price" and regards the "practice" of preparing a contract in
writing and payment of earnest money or part of the sale price as "well-
56 Fud~san Kenkyiikai (Real Estate Research Group), ed, Fud5san torihiki dai-nana ban , (Real
Estate Transactions, 7th ed) at 141-2 (Yfihikaku Sensho, 1986).
57 T5ru Ikushiro & Shinichi Yamamoto, eds, Fudjsan baibai no h5ritsu s5dan (dai-go ban);
Hritsu s5dan shiriizu 7, (LegalAdvice on Real Estate Sales (5th Edition); Legal Advice Series 7) at 190
(Yfhikaku, 5th ed 1981).
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established" and "clear in reality." The court says nothing more about this
"practice."
If there was a well-established "practice," then Suehiro, as an industry
broker, was in a position where it must have known this, and should have
ascertained with more clarity the parties' "intention" to follow the "practice,"
or to disregard it. However, the Annotated Compilation of Laws,58 cites two
Taish6 Period (1912-1926) Great Court of Judicature decisions in relation to
Article 92:
In relation to the practice of raising land rents (chidai neage) in
metropolitan Tokyo, a person in the position of expressing an
intention to transact in this way must be taken to have such an
intention unless they make a particular objection . ..The party
asserting the existence of an intention to follow [such] practice is not
required to show special proof of this.59
If we apply these approaches, then defendant Seisho Gakuen would not
have been required to prove anything with regard to the practice of drawing
up a contract in writing. The Tokyo High Court decision that presumed
Suehiro to have followed the practice should not be criticized.
The Tokyo High Court finding that there was no contract must have
come as a surprise to Nitta and Suehiro, who probably had a simple belief in
consensual contracts. The decision stands as a warning signal to parties
conducting real estate transactions in Japan.
In reality, where the value of the transaction is considerable, there will
usually be a contract in writing, and payment of earnest money or part of the
price, so this decision will not apply. But there may be situations, where the
transaction is concluded after working hours at a bank, in which the
purchaser's loan for the earnest money or the sale price cannot be concluded.
Parties need to do thorough preparation, including preparation of a draft
agreement, and then convert their oral agreement into a contractual agreement
in the shortest possible time. To do so will require the services of a lawyer,
and indeed this is really a lawyer's role. However, where this is not possible,
parties need to be aware of the Tokyo High Court decision which demands a
58 Dr. Kenichiro Osumi, ed, M5han Roppo (Sanseid5, 1982). [Translators Note] A compilation of
the Codes and statue law which is annotated with leading cases.5 9 Mhan Roppo.
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clear manifestation of the intention not to follow the usual practice as a
prerequisite to relying on the consensual contract principle.
Important Transactions and the Concept of Contracts in Writing
The Seisho Gakuen decision dealt with "land of a considerably high
value." The premise underlying the reasoning is that sales can be subdivided
into those concerning important property and those concerning less important
property. It also points out that Article 12 of the Civil Code makes this
distinction when it requires the consent of a guardian where an incompetent is
performing a juridical act in relation to "real property or other important
movables."
Article 12 (1). A person adjudged quasi-incompetent shall obtain the consent
of his curator for doing any of the acts mentioned below:
(1) To receive or make use of capital;
(2) To borrow money or become a surety;
(3) To do acts which have for their object the acquisition or the
loss of rights relating to immovables or to movables of
importance;
(4) To take legal proceedings;
(5) To make a contract, compromise or enter into agreement for
arbitration;
(6) To accept or renounce an inheritance;
(7) To refuse a gift or bequest or to accept a gift or bequest which
is subject to encumbrance;
(8) To undertake building, re-building, extension of building or to
effect extensive repairs;
(9) To let or rent property for periods longer than those specified
in Article 602.
The court found that "this practice must be given due weight," but this
proceeds from the, idea that important property and expensive real estate
should be subject to the contract-in-writing system. England adopted this
principle as part of its positive law in the seventeenth century. The important
transactions requiring writing were sales of goods with value in excess of
£10.00; sales of land; contracts for a period longer than one year; contracts
for marriage; and guarantees and promises by executors. In 1954 the writing
requirement was abolished for all but the contracts for the sale of land and the
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guarantees. America copied this seventeenth-century English model, and it
continues to this day. The contract-in-writing system thus has both old and
contemporary aspects, but much of it is a product of historical accident.
Land is never inexpensive; on occasion it can be very expensive
indeed. America applies the contract-in-writing principle. But on the other
hand, high-value sales also include the sale of corporations. The Bank of
California was acquired by Mitsubishi Bank, and Miller Beer; Elizabeth
Arden and Getty Oil have all been sold for huge amounts. But as we will see
in subsequent chapters, the 17th century English principle adopted in the U.S.
has not been extended to cover these kinds of transactions; instead the courts
have emphasized party "intent."
The Tokyo High Court Seisho Gakuen decision contains some
elements in common with American decisions. An interesting case to
compare in this regard is Reprosystem B. V v. SCM Corporation, which also
deals with the issue of writing and large-scale transactions. 60 American
approaches to the sale of corporations are examined later in the book, not
only as comparisons with the Seisho Gakuen decision, but also to illustrate
how American contract law has moved away from seventeenth-century
principles and developed in new directions.
60 Reprosystem B. V v SCM Corporation, 522 F Supp 1257 (1980); 565 F Supp 4 (1982); 727 F. 2d
257 (1984).
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